I am persuaded more and more of that truth rather guess that there are no absolute values \u200b\u200bto which to refer in the field of ethics, politics, religion etc.. It is said that there is no truth in these areas, but certainly it is impossible to access it and even if he had access would be impossible to recognize it, having to consider that a value held true, even if true, would not be universally recognized as such, so it would not be as adjectives objective. In fact - as Gramsci notes in a passage of the Prison Notebooks - the concept of "objectivity" is a metaphysical concept: it is an objective that is assessed in the same way by all subjects, this does not mean that this would also for a Martian, or a man in a 'different time from ours.
However I think that these considerations should not be extended to the whole knowable, generating skepticism rather untenable. As Wittgenstein says in the Tractatus in the world there are facts and these can be speak up and determine if the propositions they are true or false. Unfortunately, there are no ethical facts , the values \u200b\u200bare not facts: they are "things" that are not in the world and therefore we can not determine (verify) if a proposition about them is true or false. And so much of philosophy has to do with questions undecidable, unresolvable. I do not think, however, that disparages the value of the survey and I do not think that, as Wittgenstein suggests, these matters should be "silenced" the man of course raises some questions about such issues and indeed the whole of society, for better or worse, is based on attempts to respond to them. Of course it can not be never say you have made a discovery in ethics, only scientists can do, and must keep in mind that could be wrong, but there may well be some principles that appear reasonable, especially useful. Protagoras says: an agreement on profit can be found among men, exploiting the artful sophistry can persuade. Anyone scrap a proposal for ethical (or political, religious, etc..) Strives to objectify his thesis, just to make it persuasive, so that to be valid universally, or nearly so.
Think of Marx: he does not talk about ethics, it says it is "unfair" the capitalist system and that the proletariat has to fight because it achieves something "good." But this is the premise of his whole investigation and proposal that would sense his views if they do not start from the observation (ethics) of an injustice? Yet he replaces the words ethical claims with a scientific, objective, just to make them seem more solid and true, what an ethical precept, by itself, can not be. Marx then says that in capitalist society there are "contradictions", he elaborates a philosophy of history which sees the revolution of the proletariat an unavoidable step of development, leading to the creation of man in società comunista non già perché ciò sia più giusto, ma perché solo così si potrà stabilire una società priva di conflitti e contraddizioni (la filosofia che si fa mondo). E' chiaro, però, come tutti questi tentativi di oggettivazione si siano rilevati fallimentari e ciò che resta oggi di Marx è sì la sua analisi del mondo reale, ma soprattutto la constatazione che l’uomo nella società capitalistica è alienato, mercificato, privato della sua dignità, non realizzato nella sua essenza; resta che è ingiusto lo sfruttamento del lavoratore (secondo le modalità da lui descritte); resta la critica dell’economia politica e dell’ideologia borghese, ma tutti gli aspetti di necessità oggettiva si sono frantumati nell’evidenza storica che ha smentito i suoi nobili tentativi.
Ma oggi c’è una questione che pone l’etica di fronte ad un problema oggettivo, a un fatto : la distruzione ambientale. Certo, c’è molto da interpretare, ma ci sono dati fattuali che dimostrano come l’accrescimento della temperatura globale proceda parallelo all’aumento delle emissioni di anidride carbonica; che i ghiacci si sciolgano e i laghi di Ciad evaporino e le risorse non rinnovabili siano vicine al loro “definitivo” (almeno in tempi umani) esaurimento sono fatti . Si potrà discutere sui metodi per affrontarli e risolverli, ma non si può eludere il problema e la relativa discussione. Allora oggi una proposta politica e etica dovrà tener conto di questo fattore e, anzi, potrà sfruttarlo come dato oggettivo da considerare come movente di una scelta. Questo potrebbe essere un punto di forza per una critica del modo attuale di produzione (non necessariamente rivoluzionaria o che) e per la proposta di un’alternativa. Certo è che la scelta di cambiamento potrà essere fatta basandosi unicamente su esigenze materiali, ma tanto basterebbe: l’azione non sarà etica, ma se il risultato sarà “buono”, utile, tanto bene lo stesso, e viva Protagora.
Riprendo ora una riflessione che feci al tempo della lettura sulla Critica della ragion pratica di Kant e della sua legge morale. Anch’egli riteneva di dover oggettivare l’etica, di dare una legge morale che valesse universalmente. Ma, a mio avviso, anche il suo tentativo fallì miseramente. Davvero è impossibile oggettivare l’etica, se non persuadendo della validità di certe tesi facendo perno archimedeo su dati fattuali. Segue, allora, questa mia “datata” riflessione.
Kant afferma, nel corollario e nello scolio della legge fondamentale della ragion pura pratica, che “la ragion pura è per sé sola pratica, e dà (all’uomo) una legge universale che noi chiamiamo legge morale ” e che “occorre only analyze the opinion that people do on the conformity of their actions to the law. " Whatever the view, and "whatever inclination may say to the contrary, the reason will always remain" steadfast in the utmost desire of pure will, that is the single, according to reason, will not act against the moral law.
The adequacy of moral action and is dependent on the man who, by reason of it. But this view is always subjective. It seems to me that Kant, wanting to assert the universality of his moral law, suppose that the practice is universal pure reason and the law that imposes on itself comes to be, in my view, a universal law yes, but not moral in an absolute sense, because the morality of an action is subjective, depending on the individual in respect of each assessment, because the reason is not universal, there is no reason absolute, to which reference is necessarily acting in a certain way.
"The moral law - read Kant - is therefore an imperative which commands categorically, because the law is unconditional." But the imperative (moral) depends on the idea of \u200b\u200bsubjective morality, for which a specific action could be performed by a person in a conscious and considered consistent with the Basic Law, while another person may consider this action in the opposite manner. Moreover, I believe, everyone feels more or less consciously, to maintain correct behavior, or rather to act in the best way possible, while recognizing in himself the faults. This is because, if you believe you live in an incorrect manner, would seek to change, because a person can not live happily (the goal of all) if it is in conflict with itself. So, or be totally indifferent to any morality (but this is a choice that will be deemed correct), or will strive to live in the best and will be convinced of acting and thinking, if not in the best way, in a still commendable. Now, a person convinced of this, think that his actions, if carried out in accordance with the own right, will also be moral actions , that respect the categorical imperative of pure practical reason, where, assuming, as the law of pure practical reason a moral law, morality and pure practical reason are to coincide. So much so that precisely Kant says that "this principle does not prescribe to all rational beings the same rules of thumb, though in truth they are all under a common title, namely that of happiness." But this is where the problem is not requiring universal rules of thumb, a law is vague and therefore not objective, that is the law in doing so each will behave in ways even antithetical. In fact, it is true that they are all under the title of happiness, because the will of man is directed to that end, but - and Kant says - "it is impossible to consider this problem [of happiness] as a law, because this objective as should contain, in all cases and for all rational beings the same reason determining the will . For although the concept of happiness is everywhere based practice object of the report with the facoltà di desiderare, pure esso è solo il carattere comune dei motivi determinanti soggettivi, e non determina niente in modo specifico.”
Per ricapitolare, la legge morale universale non impone regole pratiche universali, ma soltanto un principio, seguendo il quale l’uomo agirebbe moralmente. L’azione pratica morale, poi, come qualsiasi altra azione è dettata dalla volontà, la quale ha come fine la felicità. Il principio però è interpretabile soggettivamente proprio perchè la felicità “si riferisce a un sentimento soggettivo di piacere o dispiacere”. Se il fine è soggettivo, sarà soggettivo anche il mezzo. E allora, come può veramente direct human action this law, and what is it?
Maybe if Kant had maintained in the Critique of Practical Reason, the three moral laws proposed in the Prolegomena, he maintained, in conjunction therewith, the very practical aspect of pure practical reason, losing, however, in universality.
